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1 Platform Economy
Digital platforms and services are ubiquitous in our daily
lives. They enable a wide range of social and economic
activities and, arguably, represent a major part of today’s
e-commerce landscape (Hesse et al. 2022; Mittendorf et al.
2019; Zimmermann et al. 2018). With billions in venture
capital and significant market evaluations, multi-sided
online platforms have emerged as viable alternatives to
traditional media channels and business models. As of
2022, examples include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Electronic commerce (e.g., Amazon, eBay, Zalando,
Etsy),
Accommodation sharing (e.g., Airbnb, Homestay),
Real estate (e.g., Booking.com, ImmobilienScout24),
Mobility (e.g., Getaround, BlaBlaCar, Uber, Lyft,
Zipcar),
Freelancing (e.g., Upwork, Fiverr, 99designs,
Freelancer),
Manual work (e.g., Helpling, TaskRabbit, MyHammer),
Micro tasks (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk,
Clickworker),
Career and job search (e.g., Indeed, Monster,
Glassdoor),
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Temp work & jobbing (e.g., Zenjob, InStaff),
Food delivery (e.g., Deliveroo, Uber Eats, Just Eat),
Research recruiting (e.g., Prolific, Qualtrics),
Dating (e.g., Parship, Tinder, Bumble),
Review sites (e.g., Kununu, Jameda, TripAdvisor, Yelp,
Google Maps),
Appointment management (e.g., Doctolib, OpenTable),
App marketplaces (e.g., Google Play, App Store),
Price comparison (e.g., Idealo, Verivox, Check24),
Crowd funding (e.g., Patreon, Kickstarter, GoFundMe,
Indiegogo),
Crowd investing (e.g., Companiso, AngelList),
Crowd lending (e.g., PeerBerry, Zopa, Ratesetter,
Funding Circle, Auxmoney),
Video streaming (e.g., Youtube, Twitch, Vimeo),
Music streaming (e.g., Spotify, Apple Music, Deezer),
Games marketplaces (e.g., Steam, Epic Games Store),
Knowledge exchange (e.g., StackOverflow, Quora),
Social and professional networks (e.g., Facebook,
Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, LinkedIn, Xing),

and many more. Not only in consumer-facing applications such as ride sharing or online review sites but also
within and across firms, digital platform concepts are
widely being used for the provisioning of technology
infrastructure and provide benefits such as increased efficiency, productivity, and innovation. All these platforms
and businesses hence impact society in many ways. As a
result of this marketization (and platformization), platforms’ design choices and algorithms affect our lives in
many ways as they – deliberately or not – set the rules for
our social and economic interactions.
By and large, the literature agrees that trust represents
one of, if not the most important factor within this platform
economy. To create the necessary levels of trust between
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service providers and consumers, platforms make use of a
broad variety of mechanisms and features (Hesse et al.
2020). Before focusing on this Special Issue’s papers, we
would like to explore the matter of online trust from the
perspective of online ratings and take a brief look at rating
valence and volume.

2 Non-linearity of Online Reputation
The power of reputation systems roots in the fact that
online markets are governed by information asymmetry
(Teubner et al. 2020). Hence, information on the past
behavior of an actor in the form of a specific rating score
can reduce this asymmetry and the associated risks for the
less informed side (usually the consumer). As this approach
attempts to infer future behavior from past behavior, it can
be understood as a backward-looking approach to engendering trust. There is, however, also a forward-looking
approach as malicious behavior is likely to be sanctioned.
Hence, the very presence of a reputation system can have a
disciplining effect. Previous work has repeatedly shown
that online reputation represents a tangible economic asset
in a variety of markets. Specifically, valence (i.e., quality)
and volume (i.e., quantity) are usually found to have positive effects on various outcome variables – including sales
(Ke 2017a; Lee et al. 2015), clicks (Ke 2017b), enforceable
prices (Ert et al. 2016; Neumann and Gutt 2017; Teubner
et al. 2017), trusting beliefs (Lee 2015; Zervas et al. 2021),
or stated purchase intentions (Abramova et al. 2017; Dann
et al. 2020).
When investigating the effects of online reputation,
most research implicitly assumes a linear effect on outcomes. Here, we want to lay out the idea that this may not
always be the case and that – when it comes to online
reputation – more (i.e., more reviews, higher scores) may
not always be better. To understand this, let us first take a
look at how the effects of rating volume and valence are
usually conceptualized.
First, the mechanism behind the positive effect of rating
valence (i.e., higher scores) is mostly straightforward. A
product (or an actor) with excellent ratings has demonstrated high quality (decent behavior) in the past, and there
is usually no reason to assume this to discontinue. Quite to
the contrary, the higher the standing rating score is, the
higher the incentive for the owner to maintain it, as there is
simply more to lose. In this sense, an Airbnb host that
drops from a 4.5 to a 3.5-star rating is almost inevitably
faced with not receiving any more booking requests and,
consequently, being excluded from the market (Teubner
and Glaser 2018; Zervas et al. 2021).
Second, review volume speaks to the popularity of a
product (social proof), the experience of an actor, but also

123

to the reliability of the score itself (Salganik and Watts
2008). In that sense, a – say – 4.6 star-rating based on 275
reviews is more reliable than the same 4.6-star rating based
on 5 reviews as, from a statistical point of view, the score’s
standard error is inversely proportional to the square root of
the number of underlying reviews (i.e., canceling out natural variation). Moreover, an average score based on many
ratings is also less likely to be subject to deliberate
manipulation (i.e., fake reviews) as these can be assumed
to be rather expensive, impractical, and hence unlikely to
be acquired at scale. In this sense, it would be much more
difficult to buy an effective share of fake reviews for 275
reviews, whereas it could be done with relative ease for 5
reviews.
Now, however, too many or all too good reviews may
introduce issues of credibility. In fact, previous work proposes that a disproportional amount of positive online
reviews might lead consumers to perceive them as
implausible (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) and that they
may become suspicious of reviews that appear to be all too
positive (Bosman et al. 2013; O’Reilly and Marx 2011). In
view of the increasing annoyance of fake reviews, this
reaction is quite understandable (Guardian 2019). Here, we
would like to propose that a rating score’s overall effect on
its holder’s trustworthiness will emerge as the interaction
of its value and its credibility where too many (or too
positive) ratings will impair credibility. In this sense, one
can ask whether online reputation may actually be too good
to be beneficent (Maslowska et al. 2016).
To explore this matter, we (1) draw on click data from a
large e-commerce website (n = 5.3 9 109) and (2) report
results from an online experiment in which we systematically vary review volume and valence and participants
evaluate different (hypothetical) seller profiles in terms of
credibility and trustworthiness (n = 575). Rather than
considering this as conclusive evidence, we would like to
offer a conceptual starting point for further thought and
research in this direction.

3 Data from an e-Vendor
As a first asset, we draw on 2019 click data from a large
e-commerce vendor across a total of 6 million active
products. To reduce the impact of outliers and one-off
effects, we here focus on products with 1000 or fewer
reviews (88% of the data) as well as prices of $3300 or less
(99% of the data), yielding a total of 5.3 billion product
page visits. Note that as per agreement with the vendor,
absolute conversion rates remain undisclosed. Figure 1
shows conversion rates by rating volume (left), rating
valence (center), as well as rating volume and price decile
(right).
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Fig. 1 Conversion rate by rating volume, rating valence, and product price

As can be seen there, conversion rates increase in rating
volume where the relation is well-approximated by a
square root function. Similarly, there is a positive relation
between rating valence and average conversation rates –
with the distinct exception of products with a straight 5.0star rating. Interestingly, products with no rating at all (i.e.,
volume = 0, valence = NA) yield conversion rates equivalent to (approximately) four stars. Last, conversation rates
are decreasing for more expensive products (where only
the least expensive price decile seems to represent an
exception).

Conflating rating volume and valence into one diagram,
Fig. 2 shows average conversion rates (y-axis) for products
with a rating score of at least 4.0 stars – grouped by review
volume (x-axis) and valence (color). Note that this rating
score is shown on the website with one decimal place
precision. Overall, both review volume and valence seem
to have positive effects on conversion, while products with
a straight 5.0-star rating form an odd exception when rating
volume increases.

Fig. 2 Conversion rate by rating volume (x-axis) and rating valence (color; 4.0–5.0 stars)
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4 Data from a Scenario-Based Online Survey
To follow up these (strictly empirical) observations and to
overcome (at least to some degree) the associated issues
due to correlations in the variables, uneven distribution of
observations, and unobserved variables, we conducted a
scenario-based online survey in which participants evaluated different product pages on a (hypothetical) e-commerce website in terms of credibility and trustworthiness –
where we systematically varied rating volume and valence.
Participants were recruited via Prolific.co (Palan and
Schitter 2018) and we used a between-subjects design
where each participant saw a random combination of one
out of six products, a random price drawn from a productspecific range, as well as the rating score. Specifically, we
used 49 different values for rating valence with increasing
granularity across the 1.00–5.00-star range. Rating volume
ranged between 5 and 1000 underlying ratings – consistent
with the distribution seen in empirical data. To evaluate
participants’ assessment of rating credibility as well as
their trust towards the product, we used three items per
construct on 1–7 point Likert scales. Full documentation of
our stimulus materials and measurement instrument is
provided in the Online Appendix (available via http://link.
springer.com).
Figure 3 shows participants’ evaluations of credibility
(left) and trust (right) based on rating valence (i.e.,
1.00–5.00 stars). As can be seen, piecewise linear regressions indicate a more or less flat level of credibility, which
only decreases when rating valence approaches the 5.00
stars boundary. Trust, in turn, exhibits a positive slope in
valence and then also drops markedly. Consistent with our
proposition, these findings suggest that a review’s effective

Fig. 3 Credibility (left) and trust (right) by rating valence
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capability to engender trust emerges as the interaction of
rating valence and credibility, where credibility itself can
be conceptualized as a function of valence:
trust * valence 9 credibility(valence).
Both our experimental and the empirical data point in
the same direction, providing a first explanation as to the
underlying mechanisms of consumers’ perceptions of
online ratings. However, note that this analysis is far from
being complete or conclusive. For instance, looking at our
experimental data, we have only briefly dived into the role
of rating valence, disregarding volume. Instead, we
understand this first glance at the data as an impulse for
deeper examination of a new perspective on online reputation, the effects of which have widely been premised as
linear. Moreover, we see potential in this matter for platform operators and service providers. This pertains to
questions such as what psychological factors are triggered
by the presence of a large number of (immaculate) reviews,
how service providers can avoid walking into this potential
credibility trap, and how platform operators can leverage
interface- and mechanism design to mitigate such negative
effects. These and other questions may offer viable directions for future research on the platform economy – beyond
the traveled paths.

5 On this Special Issue
Our motivation for this Special Issue was to shed some new
light on the less traveled paths within the domain of the
platform economy. A rich body of work has emerged
within this field, but many open questions remain – and
new ones are prompted literally every week. In addition, it
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is apparent that there exist theoretical deficits within the
platform literature. We are delighted to feature two
research papers and an interview with Rahul Jalali in this
issue.
The first paper by Lars Hornuf and Daniel Vrankar
presents results from a meta-analysis on wages on crowd
working platforms, which have become a relevant source
of income for a growing number of freelancers worldwide.
Their study points out an important – and oftentimes
overlooked – factor in this regard: unpaid work (e.g., for
maintaining one’s user profiles, searching for tasks, communicating with requesters, etc.). They suggest considering
a wage correction factor to account for the varying levels
of unpaid work necessary on different platforms and for
different job types to make research results more
comparable.
The second paper by Andrea Wrabel, Alexander Kupfer,
and Steffen Zimmermann explores the effects of scarcity
cues in electronic commerce and, specifically, how such
cues affect the processing of other relevant information
found in text reviews. Reporting findings from an online
experiment, they suggest that scarcity cues can lower the
processing of textual review information with adverse
effects on decision quality. As scarcity cues are increasingly being employed by online vendors and platform
operators, often in bad faith, as a dark pattern of choice
architecture (CMA 2022), the paper touches upon a timely
and relevant topic with implications for consumers, platforms, and policymakers.
The interview in this special issue with Rahul Jalali
(Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer at
Union Pacific Railroad) highlights a key aspect of digital
platforms – how companies can use the tools and principles
of digital platforms internally to scale their IT operations
and drive efficiency, productivity, and innovation. While
digital platforms are primarily associated with the likes of
consumers facing companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and
Youtube, the reality is that both traditional and new age
companies are leveraging digital platforms internally in
building a technology infrastructure that is scalable, replicable, and accessible. Rahul stressed the importance of
complementary capabilities such as agile development,
customer centricity, and an analytic mindset in realizing
the full benefits of digital platforms, and that digital platforms can provide a launch pad for integrating technologies
such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and deep
learning in the future.
We would like to express our profound gratitude to all
the authors, our interviewee Rahul Jalali as well as the
numerous reviewers who have contributed to the research
presented in this special issue. A very special thank you
goes to the Business & Information Systems Engineering
team that made this special issue possible. We hope that
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researchers and practitioners will find the concepts and
scientific results presented in this issue useful in furthering
research on the online platform economy.
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